This paper explores implications of differential personal taxation for corporate investment and dividend decisions. The personal tax advantage of dividend deferral causes shareholders to generally prefer greater investment in real assets under internal as opposed to external financing. Furthermore, dividend deferral is shown to be costly at the corporate level, causing shareholders in different tax brackets at times to disagree over optimal investment and dividend policies under internal financing. The profitability of internallyfinanced security investment is shown to depend on a security's tax status and shareholders' tax brackets. However, externally-financed security purchases are unprofitable from a tax standpoint.
I. Introduction
This paper explores the relation between cash dividend payouts and firm investment in real assets, given a personal tax disadvantage to dividends, an issue that has received scant attention in the finance literature. In contrast to the prior work of Auerbach (1979 Auerbach ( ), (1984 , this study formally introduces differential personal tax rates and uncertainty, demonstrates the personal tax disadvantage of early dividend payouts, and analyzes both the impact of a diminishing returns to scale technology for firm investment in real assets and the impact of double corporate taxation for firm investment in financial claims. The model developed here yields several predictions for corporate dividend and investment decisions that are consistent with those derived from the existing agency and signalling models, 1 as well as several additional predictions.
A key property of this paper's model is a firm's limited ability to costlessly defer the payout of earnings as a cash distribution to shareholders, whether through investment in real assets or financial claims. This property follows because investment in real assets is subject to diminishing returns to scale while investment in financial assets is subject to a form of double corporate taxation. Other avenues of dividend deferral are also observed to involve potentially significant costs. For example, dividend deferral through debt redemption imposes costs by forcing a firm away from its optimal capital structure (as shown in DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) ).
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Costly dividend deferral implies that at least some shareholders who bear a personal tax liability on current dividends received can support a dividend payout. The preferred dividend payment depends on the firm's investment opportunities, their required levels of financing, and shareholders' personal tax brackets. Specifically, the higher the marginal tax rate of the individual shareholder, the greater the benefit from dividend deferral through corporate reinvestment and the lower the preferred dividend level. But, given a firm's available internal funds, the smaller the size of the firm's profitable investments, the larger the optimal dividend level. Furthermore, costly dividend deferral yields a tax-based motive 1 See the agency cost models of Rozeff (1982) , Easterbrook (1984) , Jensen (1986) , and the signalling models of Bhattacharya (1979 Bhattacharya ( ), (1980 , John and Williams (1985) , and Miller and Rock (1985) . 2 Dividend deferral also can be accomplished through increased pension funding. However, as shown in Sharpe (1976) , this action can entail a significant cost. For firms with underfunded pension liabilities, the cost comes in the form of a decrease in the value of the government pension insurance. For firms with overfunded liabilities, there is a risk of increased claims by pension holders and by the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation through higher premia.
for corporate mergers between firms that are and are not engaging in costly dividend deferral.
The model's prediction that positive as well as zero dividend payout policies can be optimal is consistent with observed patterns of corporate dividend payouts as documented by Lintner (1956) , Holland (1962) , Brittain (1966) , Higgins (1972) , and Rozeff (1982) .
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This prediction also stands in contrast to much of the extant literature on corporate dividend policy, which predicts either that firms never should pay cash dividends (Bierman and West (1966) , Farrar and Selwyn (1967), and Stiglitz (1973) ) or that firm dividend policies are a matter of indifference (Miller and Modigliani (1963) , Miller and Scholes (1978) , and Auerbach (1979) ).
An important related issue concerns the profitability of corporate investment in real or financial assets once personal taxes are taken into account. As shown here, an investment's desirability to shareholders is affected by the existence of dividend deferral benefits. This causes a tax-induced interdependence between firm dividend and investment decisions with clearly testable implications. For example, it is demonstrated that shareholders generally prefer a higher level of firm investment in real assets under internal financing than under external financing. While the preferred level of externally-funded firm investment is unanimously agreed upon by all shareholders, there may be disagreements over the optimal level of internally-financed investment in an environment of differential personal taxation. Similarly, shareholders unanimously agree that externally-funded firm investment in financial assets is unattractive, while internally-funded investment in these assets may be preferred over a dividend payment. The desirability of a particular financial asset to any shareholder depends on his tax bracket as well as the tax rate implicit in the asset's return.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In Section II, the economic setting is described. This is followed in Section III by an analysis of investors' optimal portfolio decisions under personal taxation and in Section IV by a description of their preferences over the firm's investment and dividend decisions, assuming firm investment in financial assets is precluded. How these preferences over the firm's decisions change when investment in both real as well as financial assets is allowed is analyzed in Section V.
3 See Miller (1986) for a contrary interpretation of this evidence.
That section also discusses implications of the analysis for merger activity. A summary with conclusions ends the paper.
II. The Economic Setting
Consider a one good, one period uncertainty world under perfect competition in which risk-averse investors' objects of choice are claims to date 0 consumption (denominated in dollars) and two possible types of security investments: pure discount municipal bonds and shares in all-equity firms. 4 The assumption of a capital gains tax rate of zero is made in order to capture in a simple fashion the notion that the capital gains tax liability of the marginal investor in equity is generally lower than the ordinary income tax liability. This follows from the availability of tax options associated with the timing of capital gains realizations, as discussed in Constantinides (1983 Constantinides ( ), (1984 , and in the past, from a lower tax rate on long-term capital gains. Empirical evidence documented by Elton and Gruber (1970) , Kalay (1982) , Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1983) , Poterba and Summers (1984) , and Barclay (1987) is consistent with the marginal investor valuing dividend payouts less highly than capital gains, since observed price declines on ex-dividend dates are consistently less than actual dividend payouts after the passage of a personal income tax but not before. 
III. Investors' Consumption-Portfolio Decisions
Each investor i chooses his date 0 holdings of shares, municipal bonds, and claims to date 0 consumption so as to maximize his time-separable utility of date 0 and date 1 consumption. Since both the stock and municipal bond markets are assumed to be complete, the investor's date 0 choice over holdings of shares and municipal bonds can be thought of as a choice over state s contingent equity and municipal bond claims,
where each state s claim pays off $1 in state s and nothing in any other state.
Further, without loss of generality, the investor's endowment of municipal bonds can be thought of as an endowment of contingent bond claims. Then, the investor's decision problem at date 0 can be expressed as
where U i = time-separable utility function of investor i; The budget constraint (2) states that the total cost of the investor's date 0 purchases must equal the value of his endowment plus the after-tax value of any date 0 dividends received. Note that prior to date 0 trading, the firm's production and financing decisions are known to the market. Since an externally-financed firm j must sell additional shares to meet its planned after-tax production investment, q j (1-αt c ), the net market value of the firm at date 0 before any shares are sold is therefore equal to ν j-q j (1-αt c ). With the investor holding the fraction ij x of the firm's initial shares, the value of his endowment in that firm is ij x [ν j-q j (1-αt c )]. The constraint (3) states that the investor's date l, state s consumption equals the aftertax payments from his state s contingent equity and municipal bond holdings.
The date 0 market value of each firm j, v j is just the after-tax present value of its state-contingent date 1 output, and can be written, in terms of state-contingent equity prices, as
To determine the investor's optimal holdings of state-contingent equity and municipal bonds, a Lagrangian is set up to include the nonnegativity constraints on the investor's portfolio choice variables x i (s) and m i (s) for each state s. Substituting the consumption constraints (2) and (3) into the investor's utility function (1), the Lagrangian is given by
The necessary and sufficient conditions for an optimum with respect to x i (s) are
where investor i's marginal utility of date 0 and state-contingent date 1 consumption are denoted as u i0 and β i π s u is respectively. There are two possible solutions to conditions (6)- (8): either x i (s) > 0 and λ il (s) = 0, or x i (s) = 0 and λ il (s)> 0. If, at the optimum, x i (s) > 0, then (6) yields the pricing relation
is defined as the investor's marginal valuation of a one-unit equity claim in state s. That is, if he holds state s contingent equity, his marginal valuation of it is equal to its market value. If, at the optimum, x i (s) = 0, then (6) yields the alternate pricing relation
In this case, his marginal valuation of the equity claim is less than its market price, so that he will not choose to continue to hold equity.
The necessary and sufficient conditions for an optimum with respect to m i (s)
There are two possible solutions to conditions (12)- (14) 
( ) ( )
In this case, his personal valuation of the debt claim is less than its market price and he will not choose to continue to hold municipal debt.
There is only one tax rate, denoted here as ( )
, for which (9) and (15) both can be satisfied. Investors in that tax bracket are, at the margin, indifferent between investment in state s contingent equity and municipal bonds, and so are the marginal investors in the two securities. It follows from (9) and (15) The similarity between this model and that of Auerbach (1979) can be seen most directly by substituting (18) into (4) and comparing the resulting expression to (21) of Auerbach. However, because Auerbach assumes that all investors are in the same tax bracket in the formal analysis, he cannot address the issue of unanimity over production and dividend decisions or pursue the important implications of a diminishing returns to scale technology that is considered here. and consequently only holds the equity (municipals) in his portfolio.
Note that all of the low tax bracket investors who own shares agree on the value of the equity, p e (s); similarly, all of the high tax bracket investors who own municipals agree on the value of the debt, P b (s).
These results further imply that after trading at date 0, each shareholder i in firm j must hold contingent equity claims for every state in which the firm pays a date 1 dividend.
To understand why, note first that the shareholder's personal valuation of the firm at date 0 must equal its market value. That is, . Those in the highest (lowest) tax bracket have the lowest (highest) personal valuation of the firm's date 0 dividend and, therefore, of the firm cum-dividend.
IV. Investors' Preferences over the Production Level of the Firm when Security Purchases Are Precluded
At date 0, before any dividend is paid, the initial shareholders of each firm j determine both the levels of firm investment in capital projects and in securities. In order to better understand how these levels are set, assume initially that the firm is precluded from investing in securities. (This assumption is dropped in the next section.) Consider first a firm that pays no date 0 dividend and externally finances its production. The production level favored by shareholder i is found by differentiating (5) with respect to q j and setting the resulting expression equal to zero (assuming an interior optimum). This yields (20)
Every shareholder prefers the input level that maximizes the firm's net market value, v j-q j (1-αt c ). In other words, they all favor a unit increase in investment as long as the resulting increase in the present value of the firm,
, is greater than 1-αt c , the market value of new shares sold to finance the investment. Thus, even with differential personal taxation, there is unanimity over firm production decisions under external financing.
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Under internal financing, the shareholder's preferred production level may change and unanimity may no longer be attained. Again, differentiating (5) yields shareholder is optimal input level, which is given by the condition
The shareholder wants an input level that maximizes his personal cum-dividend valuation of the firm,
. Further, unless the shareholder is tax-exempt, he prefers a greater investment in the firm's production process when it is internally financed than when it is externally financed. To see this, recall that firm value is related to the production function by (4). It follows from this that (21) implies a higher production investment level than does (20), given that the production function exhibits diminishing returns to scale. 11 Thus, the investment decision is dependent on the method of financing.
Intuitively, the reason for the divergence between the two preferred levels of investment is that, under external financing, the market value of new shares sold to finance an additional unit of investment is 1-at c , while, under internal financing, the after-tax value of current dividends foregone is only (
. 12 Because of the personal tax on date 0 dividends, less than 1-at c units of consumption are given up for each additional unit of internally-financed investment. Alternatively stated, positive tax bracket shareholders require a lower marginal rate of return for internally-financed investments than for externally-financed ones. This result stands in contrast to Auerbach (1979) who argues that there is no personal tax advantage to dividend deferral. That conclusion follows from his assumption that any early dividend payout is immediately consumed and therefore is not subject to additional personal taxation after reinvestment.
Condition (21) also implies that the preferred investment level (and therefore also the preferred dividend level) under internal financing depends on the shareholder's tax bracket. Since shareholders in low tax brackets must give up a larger after-tax dividend for an additional unit of investment, they prefer a lower level of investment than do those in higher tax brackets. In particular, zero tax bracket shareholders (if there are any in the firm) prefer the least investment, the level preferred by all shareholders under external financing. Thus, the earlier unanimity results of Leland (1973) , Mossin (1977) , and DeAngelo (1981), among others, which apply when there is externally financed investment, do not generalize to the case of internal financing when there is differential personal taxation.
The lack of unanimity also can be interpreted as arising from the cost of dividend deferral. Dividend deferral is costly because the firm does not have an unlimited supply of projects that earn at least the marginal cost of capital under external financing. Given that the firm's production function is concave, a larger deferral of dividends requires the acceptance of investments with lower rates of return. Shareholders who obtain greater advantage from dividend deferral (those with higher tax rates) are willing to accept lower marginal rates of return and greater levels of investment than are those with lower tax rates. This cost of dividend deferral also explains why some shareholders prefer positive current dividend payouts, even if a personal dividend exclusion is unavailable.
12 Myers and Majluf (1984) , in a model of asymmetric information but without taxes, similarly find that internal financing is less costly than external financing.
V. Investors' Preferences over the Firm's Production Level and Security Purchases
Suppose that firms can invest in state-contingent equity and municipal debt as well as in their own capital projects. As with the optimal production level, each shareholder's preferences over security investment are governed by the investment's effect on his personal cum-dividend valuation of the firm. As shown below, this added flexibility over investment alternatives does not affect shareholder unanimity under external financing but lessens any disagreement that might arise under internal financing.
A. The Case where the Production Plan Is Externally Financed
Under external financing, a firm's shareholders decide how much new stock to sell at date 0 to finance production, and also decide whether to sell new stock to finance security purchases. The availability of security investments cannot affect the firm's production decision under external financing because unlimited funds always are available for its various real investment opportunities. Therefore, the only change in the firm's decision problem that arises is whether or not the firm should purchase any securities. In the remainder of this section, the two types of securities available for externally-financed investment by a firm at date 0 are examined.
A1. Externally-Financed Investment in Municipal Bonds
If a firm purchases state-contingent municipal bonds, the date 1 return on those bonds is treated as ordinary income when distributed to its shareholders. Therefore, the externally-financed purchase of $1 of state s contingent municipal bonds by a firm is profitable if and only if (22) ( ) ( )
equals one plus the return on the municipal bond and ( ) ( ) (
equals the increase in the firm's net market value at date 0 as a result of the purchase. As seen from (18), a price premium exists on the municipal bond so that the strict inequality in (22) cannot hold. Therefore, the externally-financed purchase of municipal bonds is unprofitable. This is reasonable since the firm's shareholders cannot take advantage of the tax-exempt status of the bonds when they are purchased by the firm.
A2. Externally-Financed Investment in Stock
The externally-financed purchase of state s contingent equity is profitable if and only represents the corporate tax rate on inter-corporate dividends. The left-hand side of (23) equals the increase in the net market value of the firm after payment of the intercorporate dividend tax. It is negative because the inter-corporate tax must be paid before the return on equity can be distributed to shareholders. Therefore, the externally-financed purchase of equity is unprofitable.
B. The Case where the Production Plan Is Internally Financed
In contrast to the previous case, under internal financing, a firm's security investments may be profitable to some shareholders. This is because the required rate of return for internally-financed security investments is lower than for externally-financed ones. As is shown below, the possibility of profitable security purchases has important implications for shareholder preferences over each firm's production level as well as for the extent of shareholder disagreement over the optimal level.
B1. Internally-Financed Investment in Municipal Bonds
The purchase of state s contingent municipal bonds by a firm as an alternative to the receipt of a $1 date 0 dividend is desirable to shareholder i if and only if
where the left-hand side of (24) is the present value of the increase in the date 1 dividend minus the after-personal tax date 0 dividend foregone by the shareholder. From (18), it follows that (24) is equivalent to
After trading at date 0, no shareholder in firm j can be in a tax bracket for which (25) holds. To see why, note that, if firm j purchases state s contingent municipal debt, it has a positive payout in that state at date 1. But, as shown previously, after trading at date 0, each shareholder i in the firm holds state-contingent equity claims for each state s in which the firm has a positive payout at date 1. In each such state, therefore, all shareholders must be in tax brackets less than or equal to that of the marginal investor, so that (25) cannot hold for them. Consequently, they do not favor the purchase of statecontingent municipal bonds by the firm, just as they do not find a direct purchase of these bonds to be profitable.
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B2. Internally-Financed Investment in Stock
The purchase of state s contingent equity by a firm is preferred by shareholder i to the payment of a date 0 dividend if and only if his tax rate is such that
The left-hand side of (26) is the present value of the increase in the date 1 dividend to shareholder i, taking into account the inter-corporate dividend tax, minus the afterpersonal tax value of the date 0 dividend foregone. Equation (26) reduces to
Of a $1 dividend per share paid to shareholder i at date 0, only
is received after personal tax. In contrast, if the firm defers the dividend payout by investing the dollar in equity, then the firm can pay a date 1 dividend with a present value of $1 less the intercorporate dividend tax. The shareholder prefers this if the inter-corporate dividend tax rate, 0.2t c , is less than the personal tax rate paid on the date 0 dividend,
In general, the purchase of equity lessens the amount of disagreement that would otherwise exist over the firm's production plan for shareholders in tax brackets greater than 0.2t c because this group of shareholders now agrees that investment in the firm's 13 This result need not be true for those investors who have a positive endowment of shares in firm j, but who sell out entirely at date 0. If these investors are in a sufficiently high tax bracket, so that (25) holds, they prefer that the firm invest in state-contingent municipal bonds rather than pay out a date 0 dividend, even though the bond's return is taxable when passed on to shareholders. Likewise, high-tax-bracket investors who hold stock for corporate control purposes also could favor this action.
production process should be made only until the present value of its after-corporate tax In addition, low tax bracket shareholders continue to disagree among themselves over the level of production. They prefer date 0 dividends to be paid (rather than having the firm invest in state-contingent equity), but if they are in different tax brackets, these shareholders differ on the optimal allocation of the firm's internal funds between date 0 dividends and investment in the firm's production process.
Some interesting implications can be derived from the foregoing analysis. First, when a manager-shareholder is in a tax bracket different from that of other shareholders, a potential conflict of interests exists between the manager and the remaining shareholders over the level and type of internally-financed investments. This suggests that a motive for some takeover bids, proxy fights, and attempts to go private may be to concentrate share ownership in a homogeneously-taxed group of investors so as to lower the agency costs associated with this conflict of interests. 14 Shareholder disagreement over internally-financed investment can also be eliminated if there is a sufficient number of independent securities in the market and investors sort themselves so that all shareholders in any internally-financed firm are in the same tax bracket.
A second implication of this paper's analysis involves the motivation for mergers.
A major tax-related benefit of mergers advanced in the literature is the ability of one of the merger partners to use the excess tax deductions of the other partner. The analysis here suggests an additional tax motive. It arises when one firm involved in a merger internally finances all of its profitable investment opportunities, while the other firm externally finances at least a portion of its investment projects. Without a merger, the internally-financed firm would take on investments with returns below the marginal cost of capital under external financing. But, in a merger, such internal funds can be redirected to the externally-financed projects of the other firm and earn a higher rate of return, equal to the marginal cost of capital under external financing.
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VI. Summary and Empirical Implications
In this paper, dividend and investment policy are analyzed under corporate and differential personal taxation. As shown in the extant literature, investors in positive tax brackets benefit from dividend deferral. For these investors, it is shown here that the cutoff rate required for project acceptance is lower when the project is internally financed than when it is externally financed. Thus, investment decisions are dependent on the source of funds with the optimal investment level generally higher under internal financing. Further, in contrast to previous research, unlimited deferral of dividends is recognized to be costly since it requires a firm either to invest in projects with decreasing marginal rates of return or in securities that require the payment of either an explicit tax on shares (in the form of double taxation of dividends) or an implicit tax on municipal bonds (in the form of a lower rate of return). Because of these costs, a positive dividend payout can be preferred by shareholders in positive tax brackets, even in the absence of personal tax dividend exclusions.
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All of these results hold with identical as well as differential personal tax rates.
However, here additional conclusions are derived under differential personal taxation. It is shown that, while shareholders unanimously agree that externally-financed investments should be made as long as they increase the firm's net market value, they may not agree on the firm's investment criterion under internal financing. Whether or not they agree depends on the dispersion of shareholder tax brackets in the firm. If the firm is not allowed to invest in securities, there is agreement only if the shareholders are in the same tax bracket. Otherwise, low tax bracket shareholders prefer less investment, and thus a greater dividend payout than do shareholders in higher tax brackets. These low tax bracket shareholders have a higher cutoff rate for internally-financed investments because they realize little, if any, personal tax advantage from deferral of dividend payouts.
However, when investment in securities is allowed, disagreement among shareholders diminishes.
The model developed here yields a number of testable predictions concerning corporate investment and dividend policies. Mergers are predicted between firms that internally finance their investment projects and firms that externally finance their projects. Such mergers can realize gains by redirecting funds from the lower-yielding projects of the internally-financed firms to higher-yielding ones in the externally-financed firms. It is also predicted that purchases of securities for investment purposes will be made only with internally-generated funds, since externally-financed purchases are unprofitable. Further, higher rates of takeover attempts, proxy fights, and attempts to go private are predicted for firms internally financing their investments due to the potential for disagreements among shareholders in differing tax brackets over the optimal investment and dividend levels.
A potential area for future research involves the conflict of interests that may arise if a firm's manager is also a shareholder and is in a different (typically higher) personal tax bracket from remaining shareholders. In this case, an agency problem results because 16 See DeAngelo (1988) for a general equilibrium argument for why dividend payout will be optimal even in the face of personal tax advantages to dividend deferral.
the manager may desire a higher level of internally-financed investment than that preferred by shareholders in lower tax brackets. This tax-induced agency problem introduces a further concern when designing management-incentive contracts to align management and shareholder interests. It also suggests an alternative motive for increasing shareholder concentration when the firm is internally financing its profitable investments.
